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 1 
The judiciary’s self determination, the common law and constitutional change 
 
Sophie Boyron * 
 
 
The Brexit debate is often analysed from the perspective of politicians, and in 
particular their views on and understandings of European law and politics. In 
contrast, this article concentrates on identifying the views of the senior judiciary. To 
do so, it analyses five extra-judicial speeches made between October 2013 to 
February 2014, a period particularly fertile in cases in the UK’s top courts 
concerning the law of the European Union or the European Convention of Human 
Rights. In doing so the article charts the senior judiciary’s vision of Europe.  More 
particularly, it highlights the judiciary's strategies to limit the impact of both 
European treaties on the British constitution in what might be termed "a search for 
judicial self-determination". In addition, the article argues that a new extra-judicial 
process of constitutional change might be emerging. Finally, it concludes on the 
advantages and drawbacks of such a process of change. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this article, I plan to analyse five extra-judicial speeches1 to investigate an aspect of 
the Brexit debate that has yet to be explored. When discussing a possible Brexit, 
commentators tend to concentrate on the possible economic effects and on the 
position taken in this debate by individual politicians and political parties. So far, little 
attention has been given to the views of the senior judiciary. Normally, one would not 
look to judges as they would be unlikely to share their personal feelings about the 
matter for fear of compromising their neutrality. However, five senior judges—
namely, Lords Reed, Sumption, Mance and Neuberger as well as Lord Justice 
Laws2—made extra-judicial speeches over a four months period all purporting to map 
the UK’s constitutional relationship with both or either the European Union and the 
European Convention of Human Rights (thereafter ECHR). 3  While no judge 
pronounced on the matter either way, the speeches—in terms of content, timing and 
context—were so unusual as to warrant analysis as part of wider debate about Brexit. 
Not only is five extra-judicial speeches in such a short time all on a European theme a 
record, but in the same period the Supreme Court decided three key cases touching 
upon the relationship of the UK constitution with the ECHR or the European Union: 
                                                        
 * University of Birmingham (s.n.y.boyron@bham.ac.uk). I am grateful to Alison Young for her 
comments on earlier versions of this article. All errors remain my own. 
1 The sake of clarity, in this article I will use the term speech to mean extra-judicial speech and I will 
use the term judgment to indicate a separate judgment in a judicial decision. 
2 All of the judges are Justices of the UK Supreme Court, with the exception of Lord Justice Laws, who 
is a judge of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales. 
3 The five speeches in question are: Lord Reed ‘The Common Law and the ECHR’ – 11 November 
2013 – Inner Temple; Lord Sumption ‘The Limits of the Law’ – 20 November 2013 – 27th Sultan Shah 
Lecture – Kuala Lumpur; Lord Justice Laws ‘Lecture III – The Common Law and Europe’ – 27 
November 2013 – Hamlyn Lectures 2013; Lord Mance ‘Destruction or metamorphosis of the legal 
order?’ – 14 December 2013 – World Policy Conference, Monaco; and Lord Neuberger ‘The British 
and Europe’ – 12 February 2014 – Freshfields Annual Law Lecture 2014 (University of Cambridge). 
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namely Osborn,4 Chester5 and HS2.6 As I show in this article, the speeches cast a new 
light on the Brexit debate. Finally, it could be thought more than a coincidence that all 
five judges chose to make speeches on either or both European treaties at a time when 
political discussions on the membership of each was raging.  
At this stage, it is necessary to give a warning: while the first two speeches 
concentrated on the ECHR (Lord Reed and Lord Sumption), the remaining three 
examined both European treaties together (Lord Justice Laws, Lord Mance and Lord 
Neuberger). Rather than excluding the first two speeches and trying to limit the 
analysis to statements concerned exclusively with the European Union in the 
remaining three speeches, I examine the statements made in relation to both European 
treaties in all five speeches. Not only is it difficult to separate those comments 
concerned exclusively with the European Union but, it will be argued that the 
resulting picture of ‘Europe’ projected by the speeches is a choice. Consequently, an 
analysis of all five speeches is necessary if the messages of the senior judiciary, or at 
least some of its members, are to be understood. This examination will be performed 
in two stages: first, the various pronouncements regarding Europe will be analysed to 
establish the vision of Europe that they convey; once this is done, it will be possible, 
in a second part, to concentrate on the aims that were pursued by the senior judiciary 
when making the speeches. 
 
 
The UK and Europe: a new judicial vision? 
 
Between November 2013 and February 2014, five members of the senior judiciary 
made speeches that each aimed to chart the relationship that the UK constitution has 
with Europe, be that the European Union or the ECHR. This flurry of extra-judicial 
activity may not be a coincidence: the possibility of a Brexit has been debated for a                                                         
4 Osborn v. The Parole Board [2013] UKSC 61. The judgment was given on 9 October 2013. Osborn 
was a determinate sentence prisoner who having been released on licence was recalled to custody. 
However, in doing so, the Parole Board did not give him an oral hearing. The Supreme Court found 
that the Parole Board had breached the common law standard of procedural fairness. For an analysis of 
this case see, Phillip Murray Procedural fairness, human rights and the Parole Board 73 Cambridge 
Law journal 5 (2014). 
5 R (on the application of Chester) v. Sec. of State for Justice [2013] UKSC 63. The judgment was 
given on 16 October 2013. Chester and McGeoch were serving a life sentence for murder: they argued 
that their disenfranchisement was a violation of their rights under the ECHR (Article 3 Protocol 1). As 
the ECtHR had found in Hirst n.2 and Scoppola n.3 that the UK’s blanket disenfranchisement breached 
the Convention, the Supreme Court ruled that the Representation of the People Act continued to be in 
violation of protocol 1 but refused to issue an additional declaration of incompatibility. 
6 R (on the application of HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v. Sec. of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3. The 
judgment was heard on 15-16 October and was given on 22 January 2014. In HS2, the Supreme Court 
reviewed the legality of a project for a high-speed rail link between London and the north of England. 
Two main grounds were put forward by the appellants: first, the Government had failed to undertake a 
strategic environmental assessment as required by the EU directive 2001/42/EC and secondly, the 
hybrid bill procedure chosen by the Government to adopt the project did not comply with the EU 
directive 1011/92/EU as it requires effective public participation in the decision-making process of 
projects that are likely to affect the environment significantly. The appellants claimed that the 
procedure would not ensure appropriate public participation as the parliamentary process is in effect 
controlled by the Government. While rejecting both claims, the Supreme Court made some key 
statements regarding the constitutional foundations for the supremacy of EU law, the content of the UK 
constitution and the cooperation with the CJEU. For further analyses of this case, see Paul Craig 
Constitutionalising constitutional law: HS2, Public Law 373 (2014) and Stephen Dimelow and Alison 
Young High Speed Rail, Europe and the Constitution, 73 Cambridge Law Journal 234 (2014). 
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while, and particularly since May 2013 when Tory rebels attempted to inscribe in the 
Queen’s speech of that year the promise made by the Prime Minister, David Cameron, 
to hold a referendum in 2017 should the Conservative Party win the 2015 general 
election. Indeed, the debate continued well into early 2014 with an ill-fated European 
Union (Referendum) Bill sponsored by James Wharton MP.7 Lord Justice Laws, Lord 
Mance and Lord Neuberger acknowledged openly the Brexit debates that were taking 
place around them (with two stating that they would not and could not take any 
position on these).8 Consequently, the speeches should be read against the danger of 
withdrawal from the European Union and the more diffuse threat to repeal the Human 
Rights Act.   
Each speech will be presented briefly and in chronological order, taking 
particular care to highlight the content or messages that relate to ‘Europe’ or to the 
European debate. Once this is completed, the various statements on Europe will be 
analysed in two ways: first, the comparative methodology deployed to arrive at them 
will be examined and secondly, the judicial vision of ‘Europe’9 will be depicted.   
 
 
The European messages of some senior judges  
 
Lord Reed - The Common Law and the ECHR 
 
Lord Reed explores the relationship between the common law and the ECHR. After 
recounting the differences in working practices that he observed during a two-weeks 
posting with the criminal chamber of the French Cour de cassation10 and a visit of the 
Supreme Court justices to the German federal constitutional court,11 he draws two 
comparative conclusions: first, other contracting states do not rely on the ECHR and 
the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (thereafter ECtHR) for their 
domestic system of rights protection;12 and, second, the ECHR can be given effect in 
different ways depending on the contracting states. As a result, Lord Reed suggests 
that the present approach to the authority of the ECtHR’s decisions should be 
changed. By reviewing a few cases, Lord Reed demonstrates that relying on the 
ECHR is often unnecessary. He concludes that one should look first to statutes and 
the common law for rights protection in the UK before relying on Convention rights. 
 
 
 
                                                         
7 The Bill’s progress was halted in the House of Lords in January 2014, as the Lords refused to 
schedule any more days to debate the bill. Since, Robert Neil MP introduced another European Union 
(Referendum) Bill that also failed to progress further than the second reading in the House of 
Commons. 
8 See Lord Justice Laws’ speech at p. 3, Lord Mance’s speech at p. 4 and Lord Neuberger’s speech at p. 
2. Neither Lord Sumption nor Lord Reed made any reference to those debates. 
9 Or to use the expression of Lord Mance, of the ‘European project,’ see Lord Mance’s speech at p. 1. 
He explains that European project rests on the twin foundations of the European Convention of Human 
Rights and on the European Union’. 
10 This French Supreme court deals with private, criminal and labour law. 
11 Lord Hope led a delegation of justices for a three-day visit to the German federal constitutional court 
in 2012, see also, Alan Paterson Final Judgment: the last law lords and the Supreme Court 222 (Hart, 
2013). 
12 Lord Reed notes that by contrast, it is commonplace in the UK for decisions of the European Court 
of Human Rights to be analysed in detail before the courts. 
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Lord Sumption – The Limits of Law 
 
Lord Sumption is interested in identifying the tasks that can be assigned to judges. As 
he sees it, this question is particularly pressing in the United Kingdom because of the 
law-making power recognized to judges and of the growing demand for courts to 
intervene in controversial social issues. To decide on these tasks, one could resort to 
the distinction between law and policy, with legal issues to be decided by judges only. 
However, according to Lord Sumption, courts everywhere tend to transform policy 
issues into legal questions. Indeed, this phenomenon of ‘conversion’ is particularly 
prevalent in the context of the ECHR. The depth and degree to which this is 
happening when interpreting the Convention is problematic: it is not consistent with 
the standard method of statutory interpretation, it raises issues of democratic 
legitimacy and leads the ECtHR to make pronouncements in law that were never 
foreseen, let alone approved by Parliament. Lord Sumption suggests that courts 
should only tackle ‘cases of real oppression’ and restrict themselves to protecting 
‘truly fundamental’ rights.13  
  
 
Lord Justice Laws - The common Law and Europe 
 
Lord Justice Laws explores the threat that both European treaties appear to pose to the 
common law, and more particularly to the common law’s two main virtues: 14 
catholicity and restraint. By catholicity, Lord Justice Laws means the ability of the 
common law to rely on foreign sources for inspiration. While some people may 
believe that the integrity of the common law is being undermined by the imports or 
influences from the ECHR or EU law, the common law has in fact always been 
inspired by foreign principles. 15 These principles are brought into English law to 
respond to a need, not to pursue a pro-European policy. Once incorporated into the 
common law, the UK courts control their content and evolution entirely. Still, Lord 
Justice Laws is concerned that deep political tensions on the subject of Europe may 
undermine the faith that people have in the common law. Therefore, he suggests first 
that one should remember that the supremacy of EU Law is entirely dependent on its 
recognition by the UK Parliament; and secondly, that UK courts reconsider the Ullah 
principle16 and change the way they give effect to the ECHR. Instead, UK courts 
should turn to the common law to develop a protection of fundamental rights. 
 
 
Lord Mance – Destruction or Metamorphosis of the Legal Order? 
 
In this lecture, Lord Mance highlights the tensions that arise in a world where supra-
national systems flourish. After listing key achievements for each European treaty, 
Lord Mance analyses the issues that national courts face when cooperating with their                                                         
13 See Lord Sumption’s speech at p. 10. 
14 In the first Hamlyn lecture, Lord Justice Laws explained that the constitutional balance between law 
and government and judicial and political power is rooted in the Common Law. He went on to explain 
that presently the Common Law faced two threats: extremism (the subject of the second Hamlyn 
lecture) and Europe (the subject of the third Hamlyn lecture).  
15 There he cites: the principles of legitimate expectations, legal certainty and proportionality. 
16 [2004] 2 AC 323. This decision established the principle that ECtHR cases should be regarded as 
authoritative in English law and should be applied in a manner akin to precedents. 
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supra-national counterparts. For instance, he notes that concerns about democratic 
deficit, judicial activism and the invasion of national law by supra-national rules are 
heard in the UK as elsewhere. UK courts may not be able to rely on the constitution in 
the same way that other European courts rely on theirs, i.e. to force a dialogue with 
their supra-national counterparts. Still, UK courts have been able to attract the 
attention of both the Court of Justice of the European Union (thereafter CJEU) and 
the ECtHR in the past. For Lord Mance, mutual cooperation is essential to the good 
functioning of the treaties and the future of the ‘European project’. 
 
 
Lord Neuberger – The British and Europe 
 
In his Freshfields Annual Lecture, the President of the Supreme Court aims to put the 
UK membership to both the European treaties in their political and cultural context 
and to dispel the idea that the common law is adversely affected by civil law notions 
imported from either the ECHR or EU law. For Lord Neuberger, the reason why 
British people do not support wholeheartedly the institutions created by either 
European treaties lies in the specific geography, religion and history of the country. 
Furthermore, the UK’s legal culture varies greatly from the legal culture found in 
many European countries. For instance, the UK’s uncodified constitution explains 
why UK courts are not in the habit of reviewing Acts of Parliament and why the 
ECHR has had since its incorporation a greater impact in the UK than in other 
European jurisdictions. Still, for centuries, the common law has been ready to 
incorporate ideas from other legal systems. 
These short presentations reveal that all five judges have clear messages with 
regard to either or both European treaties. While the content and aim of these 
messages will be analysed further on in the article, it is the comparative methodology 
used to arrive at them that will be examined now.  
 
 
An exercise in comparative re-positioning 
 
The five speeches have one trait in common: many of the messages about either or 
both of the European treaties are arrived at by resorting to comparative methodology 
or by citing comparative material. At times, judges find it desirable to rely upon 
comparative material in judicial decisions. 17 In the main, this material is used as 
inspiration by judges to address a perceived need in the law. This is sometimes seen 
as establishing a judicial dialogue across legal orders.18 Therefore, it is not surprising 
that this type of reasoning should also find its way in extra-judicial speeches that 
explore the relationship between national constitutions and supra-national legal 
orders. However, the nature of the comparative methodology employed in the 
speeches does not really serve the function identified above. Although the discourse is 
phrased in the language of comparative law, this is not about learning from the 
experiences of other jurisdictions, but about re-positioning the UK courts.                                                          
17 See for instance, Martin Gelter & Mathias. M. Siems Citations to foreign courts – Illegitimate and 
superfluous, or unavoidable? Evidence from Europe, 62 American Journal of Comparative Law 35 
(2014).   
18 These are the functions often ascribed to the use of foreign material in judicial decisions, see for 
instance, Anne-Marie Slaughter A global community of courts, Harvard International Law Journal 191 
(2003). 
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Comparative methodology: some issues 
 
In itself, the comparative methodology relied upon in the speeches is revealing: there 
are sweeping statements of little comparative value and some notable inaccuracies. 
Examples of the former include Lord Neuberger’s assertions that ‘Mainland European 
countries, like almost all other countries across the world, are used to judges 
overruling legislation enacted by Parliament’. 19 Similarly Lord Sumption suggests 
that almost ‘all written constitutions’ entrench a limited number of rights, 20  a 
statement later echoed by Lord Mance: ‘Written constitutions, containing 
fundamental rights chapters, exist in most countries.’21 Because of their generality, 
these statements tend to be uninformative and somewhat inaccurate. The value of 
comparative law resides in the careful exploration of similarities and differences 
between legal systems. For instance, the statement by Lord Neuberger about 
constitutional review in Europe is concerning: not all judges of mainland Europe are 
used to or able to overrule legislation enacted by Parliament. For instance, there is no 
constitutional review in the Netherlands – such a review is prohibited by the Dutch 
Constitution.22 In fact, the Dutch experience of rights protection would be particularly 
relevant to the UK as the protection of the fundamental rights listed in chapter 1 of the 
Dutch constitution is largely achieved through compliance with the ECHR. Similarly, 
the difficult transformation that some Nordic countries, in particular Finland23 and 
Denmark,24 have experienced with their recent acceptance of constitutional review 
belies the representation of a uniform and consensual practice of constitutional review 
in Europe.25  
In addition, there are some inaccuracies. For instance, Lord Sumption 
explained that the judiciary is not given law-making power in all legal cultures and 
cites article 5 of the French Civil Code by way of illustration. Unfortunately, Lord 
Sumption’s translation of this provision is incorrect. The provision does not prohibit 
judges from deciding cases by ‘way of statement of general principle or statutory 
construction’; instead, the provisions states: ‘Judges are not allowed to decide cases 
before them by way of general and regulatory provisions’. Furthermore, the evolution 
of the judiciary’s role in France has transformed the meaning of this provision. In 
reality, ‘la jurisprudence’26 has a strong authority and French top courts commonly 
                                                        
19 See Lord Neuberger’s speech at p. 16. 
20 See Lord Sumption’s speech at p. 10. 
21 See Lord Mance’s speech at p. 3. Before this, Lord Mance explains that: ‘In fact, the British common 
law system has been almost alone in the world in operating on a pure principle of Parliamentary 
sovereignty, unconstrained by any written constitution.’ 
22 Art. 120 of the Constitution of the kingdom of the Netherlands 2008: ‘The constitutionality of Acts 
of Parliament and treaties shall not be reviewed by the courts’, this is despite the fact that chapter 1 of 
the Constitution list fundamental rights, see Maartje de Visser Constitutional review in Europe, 79 
(Hart Publishing, 2014).  
23 See Juha Lavapuro, Tuomas Ojanen & Martin Sheinin Rights-based constitutionalism in Finland and 
the development of pluralist constitutional review, 9 International Journal of Constitutional Law 505 
(2011). 
24 See Jens Elo Rytter & Marlene Wind In need of juristocracy? The silence of Denmark in the 
development of European legal norms, 9 International Journal of Constitutional Law 470 (2011). 
25 Finish courts were given the power of constitutional review in 2000 (see art. 106 of the Constitution 
of Finland). Still, constitutional review in Denmark and Finland continue to rely markedly on the ex-
ante scrutiny of the parliamentary Constitutional law committee. 
26 This can be translated by ‘case law.’ 
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decide on ‘arrêt de principe’27 that other courts follow.28 This example is revealing of 
a superficial comparative methodology.   
On the basis of this methodology, it appears doubtful that the authors wished 
to engage in a rigorous comparative exercise. Instead, these comparative 
pronouncements were used to portray the UK legal system in a specific manner.  
 
 
The divergence discourse29 
 
On reading the speeches, one is struck by the language of divergence that is found 
therein. Many of the comparative statements highlight the differences between the 
UK and ‘mainland’ Europe or even the rest of the world. These differences can be 
grouped in three (albeit overlapping) categories: the differences between civil and 
common law jurisdictions; the differences in judicial decision-making cultures; and 
the differences between codified and uncodified constitutions. 
Although Lord Neuberger refers emphatically to the distinction between 
common and civil law systems,30 this basic difference is implied or touched upon in 
many of the speeches. For instance, Lord Sumption noted the differences between 
civil and common law jurisdictions with regard to the doctrine of precedent. 
Similarly, Lord Reed resorted to his observation of judicial decision-making in 
France, the UK and Germany to highlight the fundamental differences in the way the 
cases are handled.  
Lord Mance and Lord Neuberger underline the unique position of the UK with 
its uncodified constitution and its reliance on parliamentary sovereignty. Both explain 
the difficulties created by these constitutional characteristics: 31  Lord Neuberger 
asserts that constitutional review is not a tradition in the UK by contrast to what 
happens in other European countries. This unique constitutional landscape explains 
the role played by the ECHR and the inability of the UK courts to emulate the 
German constitutional court. Lord Mance gives the same analysis of the interactions 
between the German constitutional court and the CJEU.32 In addition, Lord Neuberger 
accentuated this message of divergence by explaining the dissimilarity in legal and 
rights cultures by reference to a separate history, geography, religion etc. This point is 
also touched upon in Lord Mance’s speech.33 
The comparative analysis deployed in the speeches emphasizes the uniqueness 
of the UK’s legal system. In doing so, the speeches perform a comparative re-
positioning by contrasting the UK’s key characteristics with those of civil law 
jurisdictions. Still, one needs to be aware of the difficulties that a divergence 
discourse may engender: for a nuanced and useful comparative analysis, it is 
necessary to find the appropriate balance between convergence and divergence, 
                                                        
27 This can be translated as ‘decision of principle’; it is the equivalent of a leading case. 
28 Furthermore, the rule contained in article 5 has always been construed by reference to article 4 that 
states: ‘A judge that refuses to decide a case because of the silence, obfuscation or inadequacy of an 
Act of Parliament will be prosecuted for denial of justice’. 
29 The question of divergence or convergence of legal orders has been hotly debated, see Roger 
Cotterell Is it so bad to be different? Comparative law and the appreciation of diversity in Comparative 
Law: A Handbook 133 (E. Orucu and D. Nelken eds, Hart Publishing, 2007). 
30 See Lord Neuberger’s speech pp. 19-20. 
31 See Lord Mance’s speech p. 9 and Lord Neuberger’s speech at pp. 15-16. 
32 See notably the reaction to C-617/10 Aklagaren v. Hans Akerberg Fransson. 
33 See Lord Mance’s speech at pp. 2-3. 
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between similarity and difference. To disregard all similarities undermines the 
comparative analysis and compromises any benefit that could be drawn from it.  
Lastly, despite a relative consensus of all judges on the uniqueness of the UK 
legal order, Lord Justice Laws and Lord Neuberger take care to explain that legal 
‘implants’ 34  or influences from civilian systems do not have any adverse effect. 
Neither the constitution nor the common law is being harmed by the influx of civil 
law principles. They both argue that such implants have been taking place for a long 
time and that the common law has the necessary flexibility to benefit from them.35 
Furthermore, Lord Justice Laws stresses that these implants fill a need and are soon 
‘naturalized,’ by becoming an integral part of the UK constitution. By the positive 
spin given to this phenomenon, they may hope to dispel the more negative 
‘isolationist’ aspects of the divergence discourse. Still, the re-positioning of the UK’s 
legal system and constitution conjured up by the use of comparative law is 
disquieting. This impression is strengthened by the vision of ‘Europe’ that emerges 
from these speeches. 
 
 
A certain vision of Europe 
 
All five judges refer to ‘Europe’ to mean either the ECHR or the European Union or 
both. The use of the term is rather symptomatic of the tone and content of the 
speeches: Lord Neuberger may investigate the reasons as to why the English are at 
odds with their European neighbours, but ‘Europe’ is presented as a single 
geographical, cultural and legal entity; all of Europe has had a rather unstable history, 
all countries have a written constitution with a bill of rights and most of these legal 
systems pertain to the same civilian tradition. There is no cultural, social or 
geographical differentiation and this is translated into a solid and quite forbidding 
legal unit. There is no recognition that there are vast differences between the 
European constitutional orders or any mention of the fact that the label of legal family 
is a contested one and that in any event the civil law family was never 
homogeneous.36 
Furthermore, the speeches tend to highlight aspects of the European treaties 
that do nothing to correct this rather ominous impression. All judges deal with some 
real or apparent negative consequences of the UK’s membership of one or the other 
European treaty. For Lord Reed, the ECHR has been given a central place in the UK 
constitution as a result of the way it is relied upon by lawyers. According to Lord 
Sumption, the ECtHR interprets the Convention in a way that allows the court to 
make law that should be left to other political institutions. Both Lord Neuberger and 
Lord Justice Laws acknowledged but combat the view that both European treaties are 
perceived as the source of destabilizing civilian influences. Even Lord Mance 
mentions the tensions arising from supra-national organisation.37 In fact, there are                                                         
34 These are more commonly called ‘transplants’ in the comparative law literature. The appropriateness 
of legal transplants has been hotly debated in comparative law circles for a long while now, see Alan 
Watson Legal transplants (Scottish Academic Press, 1974) and Pierre Legrand What legal transplants? 
in Adapting legal cultures, 35 (D. Nelken and J. Feest eds, Hart Publishing, 2001). 
35 See Lord Neuberger’s speech at pp. 26-28. 
36 For such a classification see René David Les grands systèmes de droit contemporains, (Dalloz, 
1964). It is worth pointing out that this classification is strongly contested nowadays, see for a recent 
discussion Mariana Pargendler The rise and decline of legal families, 60 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 1043 (2012). 
37 See Lord Mance’s speech at p. 1.  
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very few positive statements, let alone praise of the European treaties in the speeches, 
with Lord Mance’s speech a notable exception.38 
In addition, the solutions to the problems uncovered above do not come from 
the relevant European systems or treaties.39 The common law holds the key to solving 
the issues generated by the treaties. Both European systems appear to be lacking 
mechanisms of self-correction or intrinsic limitations that one normally finds in a 
legal order. Only Lord Mance stresses that judicial dialogue and the continued 
engagement of common lawyers in Europe would bring on more fruitful and 
influential relationship with either supra-national court.40 
Finally, the acknowledgment by three of the five judges of the political 
debates concerning a possible Brexit and/or repeal of the Human Rights Act darkens 
further this European portrait.41 Overall, these speeches offer a rather negative image 
of Europe.  
Still, the use of comparative law to emphasize the uniqueness of the UK and 
the rather negative depiction of Europe were not fortuitous. Both serve as 
justifications for the aims pursued by these extra-judicial speeches: the search for 
judicial self-determination and the exploration of constitutional change. Only then, 
will the legal specificity of the UK be protected.  
 
 
The aims: from judicial self-determination to constitutional change 
 
If one looks to the language and images that judges use in the five speeches, they 
resemble closely the ideas and concepts that are called upon in public international 
law when tackling the question of self-determination of a ‘people’.  To be clear, I 
should not be taken to suggest that the five judges are putting forward a case for the 
self-determination of the United Kingdom in the public international law meaning of 
this term; it is only suggested that the language and image of self-determination42 is 
used in the speeches as a metaphor, consciously or otherwise.  
 
 
The need for self-determination: A metaphor 
 
First, the meaning of ‘self-determination’ needs to be clarified to understand the 
metaphor and the functions it fulfills in the speeches. The right to self-determination 
is found in article 1 § 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: ‘All 
peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development’.  
 
                                                        
38 See Lord Mance’s speech at pp. 2, 4, 5 & 12. 
39 The speech by Lord Sumption may be an exception to this.  
40 See Lord Mance’s speech on the negotiation of the Brighton Declaration, p. 13. 
41 See Lord Justice Laws’ speech at pp. 3 & 7, Lord Neuberger’s speech at p. 2, Lord Mance’s speech 
at pp. 4, 5 & 6. 
42 In fact, Lord Mance mentioned: ‘concerns about identity and self-determination’ with regard to the 
ECHR, see his speech at p. 4. 
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This provision leaves many unanswered questions, and commentators warn that the 
content of this right is notoriously difficult to identify in international law.43 While it 
is beyond the scope of this research to determine the precise steps that will lead to a 
successful outcome for an international claim of self-determination, it is necessary to 
elucidate the meaning of this concept further. According to David Raic, the 
justification and main purpose of the concept of self-determination is: ‘the protection, 
preservation, strengthening and development of the cultural, ethnic and/or historical 
identity of individuality (the ‘self’) of a collectivity, that is of a ‘people’, and this 
guaranteeing a people’s freedom and existence’.44 
So, a distinct group of people which claims a right to self-determination seeks 
to preserve the existence of its separate identity based on ethnicity, culture, language 
or history. If one peruses carefully the five speeches and isolates the elements that 
may support a call for self-determination, it is possible to find references to the need 
for protection of both the ‘people’ (practising common lawyers and judges) and the 
legal culture. With regard to the people, Lord Mance may assert that ‘(…) we, its 
common lawyers, judges and courts, are [not] about to be over-whelmed or lose our 
identity in the face of any outside threat’,45 but Lord Neuberger tempers this optimism 
by explaining that in Europe common lawyers are ‘heavily outnumbered’46 and that 
‘(…) the Luxembourg and Strasbourg courts are manned by judges whose knowledge 
and experience are almost exclusively civilian law rather than the common law’.47 
This feels only one step away from claiming minority status, a common enough 
reason for claiming a right to self-determination. 
Beyond the claims by Lord Mance and Lord Neuberger that the UK has a 
different history, religion and geography, all judges point to specific differences of the 
UK’s constitutional order by comparison to those of mainland Europe, be it the lack 
of constitutional review, the common law tradition, or other aspects that make this 
system distinct. This follows the comparative re-positioning that emphasised the 
uniqueness of the UK’s legal order. In addition, Lord Justice Laws,48 Lord Mance49 
and Lord Neuberger50 clearly identified a separate legal culture for the UK. Lord 
Neuberger isolated the distinctive traits of this culture: a pragmatic approach, judge-
made legal principles and a distinct forensic attitude.51 Furthermore, one discerns a 
sense of unease with regard to the preservation of this culture: the speeches of Lord 
Sumption, Lord Justice Laws, Lord Mance and Lord Neuberger contained references 
to ‘concerns about supranational invasion’ (Lord Mance), 52  to the issue of 
‘undesirable … civilian law influences’ (Lord Neuberger),53 and ‘the threat to the                                                         
43 See J. Klabbers The right to be taken seriously: Self-determination in international law, 28 Human 
Rights Quarterly 186 (2006): ‘The right to self-determination easily qualifies as one of the more 
controversial norms of international law’. 
44 See David Raic Statehood and the law of self-determination 223 (BRILL, 2002). 
45 See Lord Mance’s speech at p. 13, where he also states: ‘Common lawyers are eminently adaptable. 
Their contribution in co-operation with European supra-national courts and other European national 
courts has I believe been very fruitful and significant in the past.’   
46 See Lord Neuberger’s speech at p. 20. 
47 See Lord Neuberger’s speech at p. 20. 
48 See Lord Justice Laws’ speech at pp. 3-4. 
49 See Lord Mance’s speech at p. 13. 
50 See Lord Neuberger’s speech at p. 19: ‘A second cultural factor which distinguishes the UK from 
almost all other countries in Europe, is a common law system, whereas they have a civilian law 
system’. 
51 See Lord Neuberger’s speech at pp. 19-20. 
52 See Lord Mance’s speech at pp. 5 & 6. 
53 See Lord Neuberger’s speech at p. 3. 
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common law’ (Lord Justice Laws),54 with the most apocalyptic warning to be found 
in Lord Sumption’s conclusion.55 In addition, Lord Neuberger highlighted the risk of 
this ‘minority’ culture being misunderstood.56 Finally, both Lord Justice Laws and 
Lord Neuberger reproduce in full Lord Denning’s famous quote of the ‘flowing tide 
of Community law’ with its clear image of invasion and devastation.57  It may be 
over-stating the case to say that this legal culture is depicted as under attack, but all 
judges either express some concerns themselves or attempt to address fears commonly 
expressed by others on this subject. 
In view of the possible threat to the legal and constitutional system that the 
metaphor seems to reflect, the senior judiciary would have been justified in devising 
ways of protecting the specificities of this system. I will attempt to show below that 
the speeches are part of a complex process of constitutional change that served to 
secure a degree of judicial self-determination. 
  
 
Beyond the metaphor: a process of constitutional change? 
 
The metaphor identified above, points to a need, if not a call for judicial self-
determination. In this, it provides the impulse for the proposals canvassed in the extra-
judicial speeches and for a sophisticated process of constitutional change. To study 
this process of change, the extra-judicial speeches will be analysed together with the 
Supreme Court decisions that were at the heart of this dynamic. It will be suggested 
that the speeches and the decisions combined to form a dynamic that led to a 
formidable and swift process of constitutional change.  
 
 
Supreme Court decisions and extra-judicial speeches: dialogues and outcomes 
 
Having analysed the extra-judicial speeches individually at the outset, it is now 
necessary to analyse them in light of the three decisions of the Supreme Court that led 
to this flurry of extra-judicial activity. After all, October 2013 was an unusually 
‘European’ month for the Supreme Court as it gave judgment on both Osborn and 
Chester and heard HS2. The confrontation of the extra-judicial writings with the 
output of the Supreme Court will shed light on an unusual creative dynamic.58  While 
the speeches aimed to explain or comment on Osborn and Chester, two also mapped 
the path to a solution in HS2. For the purpose of this demonstration, close attention 
will be given to the authors of the speeches, the creative dialogue that took place via 
the speeches and finally, the constitutional solutions that emerged from them.  
 
                                                         
54 See Lord Justice Laws’ speech at p. 4. 
55 See Lord Sumption’s speech at p. 15. 
56 See Lord Neuberger’s speech at p. 19: ‘This leads to the risk of an approach to our forensic 
procedures, indeed sometimes to our whole forensic attitude, which, at least from an English lawyer’s 
perspective, misunderstands our we work’. 
57 This metaphor can be found in the judgment of Lord Denning in Bulmer v. Bollinger [1974] Ch. 401.  
58 I am grateful for the work of Harry Annison Interpreting the politics of the Judiciary: the British 
Senior judicial tradition and the pre-emptive turn in Criminal Justice, Journal of Law and Society 339 
(2014). While it was not possible to make full use of the careful research methodology applied in the 
work, it framed my thought process and comforted me in the belief that the extra-judicial speeches 
needed also to be read as a whole with the three Supreme Court decisions. 
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Engaging in multiple dialogues 
 
To understand the creative dialogues that the speeches seem to have promoted, it is 
necessary to begin by identifying the authors of the speeches as they are the main 
participants to these dialogues. Of the five extra-judicial speeches, only one – the 
third Hamlyn lecture of Lord Justice Laws – was not delivered by a member of the 
Supreme Court, but instead by a member of the Court of Appeal who famously 
advocated the recognition of constitutional statutes. 59  Among the justices of the 
Supreme Court that delivered a speech, one finds: Lord Reed, author of the first 
speech, who delivered the sole judgment in Osborn and one of the lead judgments in 
HS2; Lord Sumption, author of the second speech, who delivered an additional 
judgment in Chester and a concurring judgment in HS2; Lord Mance, author of the 
fourth speech,60 who delivered the lead judgment in Chester and a joint concurring 
judgment61 with Lord Neuberger in HS2; Lord Neuberger, author of the fifth speech62 
and president of the Supreme Court, who delivered a joint concurring judgment with 
Lord Mance in HS2. On seeing the authors, their involvement in the cases and the 
time-line, neither these speeches nor their timing seem altogether random. On close 
analysis, the five speeches appear to establish different types of judicial dialogue.63 
As is usual for these speeches, they were clearly aimed at the specific 
audiences they were addressing and beyond that at the wider public. For instance, 
when Lord Reed gave his speech to the Inner Temple, he explained the wider context 
for the important change of judicial policy contained in Osborn. To this effect, he 
referred to elements that would not have found their way in his judgment, such as his 
personal experience of judicial decision-making in other European legal systems. In 
doing so, he provided a more accessible analysis of the case. While the speech was 
mostly explanatory, it participated in a wider dialogue with the legal professions. 
Still, another type of dialogue seems to take place alongside: the speeches 
provided a form of internal dialogue for the members of the senior judiciary closely 
involved with one or more of the three Supreme Court decisions. For example, not 
only did Lord Justice Laws analyse both Osborn and Chester quoting Lord Reed, 
Lord Mance and Lord Sumption, but he endorsed also the ruling in Osborn. 64 In 
addition, he noted and agreed with Lord Reed’s extra judicial speech. 65  This 
continued with Lord Mance’s speech. Not only did Lord Mance endorse Lord Justice 
Laws’ dicta in Thoburn,66 but he also quotes directly from his Hamlyn lecture67 and 
from Lord Sumption’s speech.68 These cross-references seem to indicate an intra-
judicial dialogue prior to judicial policy choices being made. In fact, Lord Mance’s 
speech was mostly exploratory; he was canvassing possible solutions prior to a 
judgment in HS2.                                                          
59 See Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council [1990] QB 151. 
60 This was the last extra-judicial speech before HS2. 
61 All five other justices agreed with this joint concurring judgment. 
62 This was produced after HS2 was handed down. 
63 Here the definition of ‘dialogue’ is taken from the Oxford dictionary: ‘discussion between two or 
more people, especially one directed towards exploration of a particular subject or resolution of a 
problem.’ It is used in a similar way as in the work of Alan Paterson Final Judgment: the last law lords 
and the Supreme Court 9 (Hart, 2013). 
64 See Lord Justice Laws’ speech at p. 10. 
65 See Lord Justice Laws’ speech at p. 8. 
66 See Lord Mance’s speech at p. 10. 
67 See Lord Mance’s speech at p. 3. 
68 See Lord Mance’s speech at p. 3. 
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In addition, an attentive perusal of the speeches reveals a probable 
engagement with the wider judicial community. For instance, when Lord Justice Laws 
commented on Ullah he stated: ‘I have in common with others come to think that this 
approach represents an important wrong turning in our law;’ 69 For his part, Lord 
Mance speaks of ‘the expression of concern from some judicial colleagues’ regarding 
the more controversial EU legislation or case of the CJEU or ECtHR. 70  It is 
suggestive of other discussions happening in the background.  
Finally, the speeches have also been attempts at a dialogue with the ECtHR 
and the CJEU. Each speech contained clear messages for one or both courts. 
According to Alan Paterson, one objective of the Supreme Court has been to establish 
appropriate dialogue with the courts in Europe.71 He adds that while exchanges with 
the ECtHR are common and take various forms (including extra-judicial speeches), 
the situation is different with the CJEU.72 Consequently, the relevant speeches and 
HS2 should be analysed together as an attempt to establish a dialogue with the 
Luxembourg court.  
 
 
Finding constitutional solutions 
 
The speeches did more than simply allow senior members of the judiciary to 
exchange ideas. It gave them a forum to identify and sketch possible answers to the 
issues in HS2. In fact, it is possible to see in the speeches, the burgeoning of solutions 
later used in the judgments.  
As a result of the substantive grounds argued by the appellants, the Supreme 
Court was faced with significant constitutional issues. For this reason, HS2 contained 
three key pronouncements on the constitutional foundations for the supremacy of EU 
law, the cooperation with the CJEU and the recognition of constitutional instruments 
and principles. As their roots can be traced to the speeches, it may help an 
understanding of HS2 to explain the origins of these judicial pronouncements. 
First, the decision in HS2 aimed to clarify the constitutional foundations for 
the relationship between UK and EU law and therefore for the supremacy of EU law 
in the United Kingdom. These points were canvassed in the extra-judicial speeches of 
both Lord Justice Laws and Lord Mance. Lord Justice Laws noted that the supremacy 
and reach of EU law in the UK rested entirely on the European Communities Act 
1972 and was ‘ultimately a function of Parliament’s will’. He also quoted the doubts 
that he had expressed in Thoburn73 that the ECA 1972 may not be sufficient to allow 
the incorporation of a EU provision in direct conflict with a UK constitutional or 
fundamental right. He added in his lecture that Parliament should not be assumed to 
have given ‘carte blanche’ to the European legislature.74 As for Lord Mance, he began 
by noting that the German federal constitutional court (thereafter 
Bundesverfassungsgericht) has had a leading role in defining the legal relationship                                                         
69 See Lord Justice Laws’ speech at p. 9.  
70 See Lord Mance’s speech at p. 3. 
71 Alan Paterson Final Judgment: the last law lords and the Supreme Court 221 (Hart, 2013). 
72 Idem, pp. 223-224.  
73 Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council [2003] QB 151. 
74 See Lord Justice Laws’ speech at p. 7. Previously, he had suggested a different approach by equating 
EU legislation to secondary legislation as secondary legislation cannot ‘abrogate a fundamental or 
constitutional right’ in the absence of express authorisation. 
Word Count: 6,300/8,800 
 14 
between European and national legal systems: while the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
had been careful to give effect to the decisions of the CJEU, it had fought to ensure 
that the CJEU remained within the limits of its powers.75 Interestingly, Lord Mance 
referred also to the more recent skirmish between the two courts: in a judgment of 
April 2013,76 the Bundesverfassungsgericht reacted to the CJEU’s claim made two 
months earlier that the Charter of fundamental rights applied whenever a Member 
State acts within the scope of EU law.77 Even though Lord Mance underlined the 
difficulties of using the German example as a model for the UK constitution,78 it may 
have served as inspiration79 for the pronouncements in HS2 on supremacy and reach 
of EU law by Lord Reed on the one hand and Lord Neuberger and Lord Mance on the 
other. In fact, Lord Mance indicated in his extra-judicial speech that both 
constitutional statutes and fundamental common law rights would impose a limit to 
the supremacy of EU law.80 This is barely a step away from the pronouncements in 
HS2 that any conflict between EU law and a UK constitutional principle, statute or 
fundamental right were to be resolved by reference to the UK constitution81 and that 
the relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union was 
determined by reference to UK constitutional law.  
Similarly both Lord Justice Laws and Lord Mance touched upon the content 
of the UK constitution in their speeches when tackling the issue of the relationship of 
the UK with the EU. Lord Justice Laws had been the first in Thoburn to suggest that 
there existed a category of constitutional statutes 82  that could not be impliedly 
repealed. He returned to this analysis in the Hamlyn lecture. Similarly, Lord Mance 
having searched to limit the supremacy of EU law cites constitutional statutes and 
fundamental common law rights but admits that these are not as efficient as a written 
constitution.83 On comparing the two extra-judicial speeches with the analysis in Lord 
Neuberger’s and Lord Mance’s concurring judgment on the content of the UK 
constitution, it appears that on this point, the content of the judgment is close to the 
proposals found in the extra-judicial speeches. 
                                                         
75 See the decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Solange I (Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 
[1974] CMLR 540) and Solange II (Re Wuensche Handelsgesellschaft [1987] 3 CMLR 225) that aimed 
to protect the effectiveness of the German constitution and its protection of fundamental rights. 
76  Judgment of 24 April 2013 1 BvR 1215/07. Interestingly, this decision of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht was referred to by Lord Neuberger and Lord Mance in their concurring 
judgment to support the idea of a cooperative relationship between the CJEU and national 
constitutional or supreme courts. 
77 See Case 617/10 Aklagarren v. Hans Akeberg Fransson. 
78 See Lord Mance’s speech at p. 10. He concludes that the situation in very different in the UK as the 
ECA removed any constitutional obstacles to the supremacy of EU law, and to the point that the ECA 
as a constitutional statute is itself protected. He notes that presently there are ‘few limits to the 
dominance of EU law.’ 
79 In fact, there may be a precedent for that: the Bundesverfassungsgericht may have served in the past 
as inspiration to establish a better dialogue between the Supreme Court and the ECtHR, see Alan 
Paterson Final Judgment: the last law lords and the Supreme Court 233 (Hart, 2013). Finally, the 
reference to the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s decision of April 2013 in Lord Neuberger’s and Lord 
Mance’s concurring judgment shows reliance on the decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht. 
80 See Lord Mance’s speech at p. 10. 
81 See Lord Reed at p. 29 [§ 79]: ‘if there is a conflict between a constitutional principle, such as 
embodied in article 9 of the Bill of Rights, and EU law, that conflict has to be resolved by our courts as 
an issue arising under the constitutional law of the United Kingdom’ and see the more thorough 
analysis by Lord Neuberger and Lord Mance at p. 72 [§ 206-208]. 
82 The ECA 1972 was identified as one of the constitutional statute. 
83 See Lord Mance’s speech at p. 10. 
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Finally, Lord Neuberger and Lord Mance drafted their joint concurring judgment to 
contest the interpretation by the CJEU of the relevant directives. Although the 
substantive analysis could not have been predicted,84 an attempt at dialogue ought to 
have been expected.  Not only did the subject of dialogue arise obliquely in Lord 
Justice Laws’ lecture85 but Lord Mance praised judicial dialogue as a way for national 
courts to influence the case law of the CJEU in his extra-judicial speech.86 What is 
interesting however, is the reference in the judgment to the risks that these ‘creative’ 
interpretations of the CJEU may lead to: a lack of legal certainty, a loss of confidence 
in EU legislation, the compromise of judicial cooperation, the negative impact on 
subsequent legislative processes. The concerns expressed by both justices reflect for a 
large part those expressed by the members of the senior judiciary in their extra-
judicial speeches: the legitimacy of the EU and its activity (whether legislative or 
judicial) was considered a challenge by Lord Mance and Lord Justice Laws.  
This analysis tries to show that the extra-judicial speeches should be regarded 
in this context at least, an integral part of this judicial decision-making process and 
unusual process of constitutional change. 
 
 
Extra-judicial speeches and constitutional change: grand design and judicial self-
determination 
 
Beyond the pronouncements explained above, I will argue that the decision in HS2 
may have been part of a ‘grand design’: a programme of constitution building that 
was used to secure judicial self-determination.87 Indeed, on reading Osborn, Chester 
and HS2 together with the five extra-judicial speeches, one wonders whether the court 
may have mapped a two-phase programme. With Osborn, the Supreme Court may 
have aimed to ‘repatriate’ fundamental rights by encouraging lawyers (and 
presumably judges) to look for rights and freedoms in the common law first. Reading 
the sole judgment delivered by Lord Reed88 together with his extra-judicial speech89 
gives credence to this interpretation. Not only would this recognition avoid too great a 
reliance on the ECHR but it would also increase the substantive content of the 
constitution. In effect, this would really ‘bring home’ to the United Kingdom the 
protection of fundamental rights. 
When presented in this light the policy pursued in Osborn fits well with the 
pronouncements made five months later in HS2, the second phase of this possible 
programme of constitution-building. There, the Supreme Court elaborated further on 
the content of the UK constitution: not only did it recognise the category of 
constitutional statutes that was first discussed in Thoburn but it added fundamental 
rights and constitutional principles arising from the common law.  Although the 
decision contained few details as to the practicality of this recognition, the court took 
steps to protect these newly discovered constitutional statutes, principles and 
fundamental rights. By proclaiming the superiority of the UK constitution over EU                                                         
84 The relevant directives were not even mentioned in any of the speeches. 
85  See Lord Justice Laws’ speech at p. 9 where he quotes Lord Neuberger who warned against 
systematic acquiescence to the Court of Justice’s rulings for fear of destroying the ability to engage in a 
constructive dialogue with the Court. 
86 See Lord Mance’s speech at pp. 12 & 13. 
87 Of course, there would have been a degree of serendipity with regard to the extra-judicial speeches. 
88 See Lord Reed at pp. 22-25 [§54-63]. It is notable that the judgment was agreed to by all four other 
justices and that the panel included both the President and the Deputy President of the Supreme Court. 89 See the entirety of Lord Reed’s speech. 
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law in the event of a conflict, the Supreme Court in effect created a constitutional 
hierarchy of norms. This should bring some emancipation from EU law and its 
doctrine of Supremacy.90 
Should this programme of constitution building be put into full effect, the 
Supreme Court would certainly regain a degree of constitutional autonomy from both 
the ECHR and the European Union. In addition, the Supreme Court would recover 
some control over the evolution of the UK’s process of legal and constitutional 
development and a chance to shape the UK constitution for the future. Indeed, the 
‘grand design’ has the potential to deliver the judicial self-determination that the 
senior judiciary feel they need to combat the negative aspects of the present supra-
national era.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In view of the potential transformation that was achieved, this process of 
constitutional change has some notable advantages: this was concluded swiftly and 
with minimum risk as the speeches allowed ideas and solutions to be canvassed ahead 
of their adoption. Furthermore, the process itself was more transparent and seemingly 
more inclusive than simply departing from existing precedent. Finally, it allowed the 
senior judiciary to show that they were aware of the political debates around them and 
to adopt a coherent but flexible policy by way of response. Only the future will tell 
whether this unusual process will be used again and whether it has engineered lasting 
change. One may wonder what impact, if any, these Supreme Court’s innovations are 
likely to have on the Brexit debate. Still, they may help address the concerns and 
frustration that are palpable from reading the speeches and that are seemingly shared 
by the senior judiciary and probably by the larger judicial community.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                        90 In doing so, the Supreme Court approved the ruling in Factortame except in the event of a conflict between EU law and UK constitutional law, or more precisely when the UK’s ‘constitutional identity is or may be engaged’, see Lord Mance in Pham v. Sec. of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19.   
